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I. INTRODUCTION

Academic research and writing generally focus on the theoretical
doctrines of the law and the policy choices that they represent. Law
school courses and continuing legal education programs primarily
utilize published, appellate court decisions as the source of these
doctrines. But what happens if the policy choices reflected in the
statutes, administrative regulations, and appellate case law do not
reflect the actual practice of trial courts and administrative agencies?
This Article explores that question as it relates to the Massachusetts
Department of Social Services ( DSS ) and the procedures for
substitute care and custody of minor children in the Commonwealth.
Part II presents three case studies based upon the authors work as a
student attorney at the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau from 1998 to 2000.
Efforts were taken to protect the anonymity of the case study
participants, including the omission or amendment of certain
identifying details; however, the relevant portions of the narratives
are true.1 Part III explores the basic legal doctrines used in
proceedings initiated by DSS regarding the care and custody of
minor children. Further, Part III analyzes the case study findings in
order to compare the reality of experiences of the three clients to the
theoretical legal doctrine outlined. Finally, Part III argues that the
Massachusetts Department of Social Services has repeatedly
circumvented the requirements governing substitute care and
custody of minor children whose best interests it is supposed to
protect.
According to the statute governing the protection and care of
children in Massachusetts, it is the policy of the Commonwealth to
strengthen and encourage family life for the protection and care of
children; to assist and encourage families to use all available
resources to this end; and  to provide substitute care of children only
when the family itself . . . [is] unable to provide the necessary care
and protection to insure the rights of any child in sound health and
2
normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral development.
According to its own Statement of Philosophy, it is the goal of DSS to
 make every reasonable effort to encourage and assist families to use
1. Although identifying characteristics have been omitted or changed, the
events and their basic chronology are true and accurate. In an additional effort to
protect anonymity, the case studies consist of composites of several clients.
2. MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 1 (West 1993); see also MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN .
ch. 18B, § 3(A)(1) (West 1994) (requiring DSS to provide service programs to
strengthen and encourage family life).
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all available resources to maintain the family unit intact. The
Departments Principles of Service further recognize that,  consistent
with the need to ensure the safety of children, the family is the best
4
source of child rearing.
Furthermore  substitute care is a
temporary solution requiring DSS to direct its efforts toward
5
reunification of children and parents.
II. T HE CASES
A. Case #1: Amy A.s Neglect
Amy A. is a single mother with one daughter, Abigail A. Before
DSS became involved in their case, Amy had sole physical custody of
Abby since divorcing Abbys father, Andrew A., when Abby was an
infant. During their marriage, Andrew was verbally and physically
abusive to Amy. Amy called the police several times during their
marriage and she filed several incident reports with the police. After
they divorced and prior to DSSs involvement with the family, Andrew
had only sporadic contact with Abby and has paid no child support
since the divorce, despite a court order that he do so. In fact, the
Massachusetts Department of Revenue attempted to garnish his
wages to collect on the substantial child support obligation that he
had accumulated. Andrew never showed any serious commitment
toward sharing custody or having regular, substantial visitation with
his daughter and he began to be verbally and emotionally abusive
toward her during the few visits that they had together. Amy, on the
other hand, has been a devoted mother to Abby, who is a happy, welladjusted little girl.
Amy works part-time and is occasionally required to work evenings
or nights, although she primarily schedules her shifts so that she is at
work during the day while Abby is at school. When she has to work
nights, she leaves Abby in the care of her parents, Abbys
grandparents, who live nearby and have had a significant caretaking
presence in Abbys life.
In the fall of 1997, Amy developed a dependency on Percocet, a
prescription painkiller and sedative. Eventually, her dependency
turned into a more serious heroin addiction. After using heroin for
several months, Amy recognized that she had a problem. She called
her parents and told them that she wanted to check herself into an
3. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 1.01 (1993).
4. Id. § 1.02(2).
5. Id. § 1.02(4).
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inpatient drug rehabilitation program. Her father drove her to the
hospital, where Amy checked herself in through the emergency
room. During this time, Amys parents took Abby back to their house
and cared for her. After two weeks in the hospital Amy was
transferred to a daytime treatment facility for substance abuse.
While Amy was undergoing treatment at the hospital, one of the
hospital counselors filed a report with DSS pursuant to the
Massachusetts mandatory child abuse reporting statute,6 apparently
believing that Amy had neglected or abandoned Abby by leaving her
with her grandparents when she checked herself into the hospital.
Unbeknownst to Amy, a DSS investigator went to Amys parents
house and took Abby into protective custody prior to investigating
the complaint.
Pending the outcome of the Departments
investigation, DSS placed Abby in foster care and notified her father.
DSS then allowed Andrew to pick up Abby from the foster home for
7
visitation. He never returned her to the foster home. Instead, with
encouragement and legal advice from the DSS social worker on the
case, Andrew kept Abby in his custody and filed an emergency
motion for temporary custody with the probate court, which the
court granted.
A few days later, Amy received a form letter from the DSS social
worker explaining that her investigation had found reasonable cause
to support the allegation that Abby had been  abused and/or
neglected (at least, presumably, as the letter addressed to Amy
incorrectly contained a different childs first name). The letter also
informed Amy that although the allegation was supported, DSS did
not find it necessary to open a file on Abby for an assessment. The
letter went on to explain that an assessment is  an opportunity for
[DSS] to collect information on [the] need for services and to
8
develop a plan for how services will be delivered to [the] family.
6. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 51A (West 1993) (requiring medical,
mental health and human services personnel who, in their professional capacity,
have reasonable cause to believe that a minor child is  suffering physical or
emotional injury resulting from abuse or neglect to report the childs condition to
DSS immediately, legal privileges relating to confidential communications
notwithstanding). The phrase  reasonable cause to believe has been construed as
being equivalent to the phrase  known or suspected instances of child abuse and
neglect used in the federal regulations, 45 C.F.R. 1340.3 3(d)(2)(i). See 66 Op.
Atty Gen. 157 (1975).
7. Cf. MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 35 (West 1994) (allowing a parent,
guardian, or next of kin to visit a child placed in state custody at court ordered times
and conditions).
8. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 5.01 (1993) (defining an assessment as  the
process of gathering and evaluating information regarding a family or individuals
situation, in order to determine: (a) whether services are necessary, (b) which
services would be appropriate, and (c) who could best provide the needed services
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DSS closed the investigation, leaving Abby temporarily in the physical
custody of her father and leaving Amy unsure of how to proceed
legally to get her daughter back.
Amy successfully completed the five-week daytime treatment
program and entered into a heroin recovery counseling program,
which included methadone treatment that was gradually reduced
9
each month. Upon her discharge from the treatment program, Amy
obtained legal counsel and petitioned the court either to vacate the
temporary order of custody and return Abby to her care, or to
10
appoint a guardian ad litem ( GAL ) to evaluate the family. The
court denied both motions, and a custody battle ensued. Andrew
repeatedly discussed the custody battle with Abby, threatening her
and telling her that she would have to choose between her parents.
During the time that Abby was living with Andrew, Amy arranged for
her to meet with a child psychologist to help her deal with the
uncertainty of the situation. However, Andrew, as her custodial
parent, felt that Abby did not need treatment, and it was ultimately
discontinued. After more than a year of protracted custody litigation,
Andrew spontaneously agreed to return Abby to Amys custody. The
court issued a new temporary order, although, to this day, Amy still
does not have permanent custody of her daughter.

and (d) the desired outcome(s)/behavioral changes to be achieved. ). According to
the DSS regulations, an assessment of a familys or individuals need for services must
be completed for each new case. See id. § 5.02. However, DSS is not automatically
required to open a case file if it finds a report to be supported by reasonable cause,
as long as the child is not at an ongoing risk. See id. § 9.04(1) (highlighting
commentary that illustrates why DSS is not required to open a case if the child is not
an ongoing risk). Once the assessment is completed, the supported decision in the
case automatically undergoes an administrative review. See id. § 5.05(1). The
administrative review considers all information gathered during the assessment, as
well as the original information that resulted in the supported decision. See id. §
5.05(2). This process determines whether the supported decision should be
changed to unsupported, either because the supported decision was unreasonable or
because of new information uncovered during the assessment. See id. If a supported
decision is changed to unsupported after the administrative review, DSS expunges
the supported decision from its Central Registry and the parents and the reporter
are notified of the change. See id. § 5.05(3).
9. Amy continues to attend counseling twice a week since completing the
daytime treatment program, once per week in a group session and once per week in
individual therapy.
10. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 215, § 56A (West 1989) (granting Massachusetts
probate courts the power to appoint GALs to investigate the facts in any proceeding
involving domestic relations or relating to the care, custody or maintenance of minor
children); see also MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 201, § 34 (West 1994) (authorizing
courts to appoint GALs in any other proceeding in which a minor has an interest).
After the investigation, the GAL files a written report with the court. See MASS. GEN .
LAWS A NN . ch. 215, § 56A; MASS. R. PROB. CT., Practice 32; MASS R. PROB. & FAMILY
CT. Order 2-98.
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B. Case #2: Bill B.s Unfitness

Bill B. is an older gentleman with several adult children. In the
1970s, while his older children were growing up, he had a serious
problem with alcohol abuse. After extensive involvement with the
family, DSS terminated Bill and his first wifes parental rights and
11
placed the children in foster care.
Since that time, Bill has
undergone alcoholism treatment and has been sober for almost two
decades. During his recovery, Bill has worked hard to mend his
relationship with his older children.
Bill became a father again when his second wife, Barbara, gave
birth to their son, Bobby. Unfortunately, Barbara has a serious drug
abuse problem, primarily with crack cocaine. When Bobby was born,
Bill separated from Barbara, concerned that her drug use would be
detrimental to their son. Bill has had sole physical custody of Bobby
since he was an infant, and has been his primary caretaker. Bill has
allowed Barbara to have only minimal contact with Bobby because of
his concerns with her ongoing addiction.
Because Barbara used drugs while she was pregnant, Bobby has
special needs, including learning disabilities and behavioral
problems. When Bobby reached school age, Bill enrolled him in
special education classes. At first, Bobby struggled with controlling
his behavior and completing his schoolwork. Bill retired from his job
in order to stay home full time with Bobby, particularly to help Bobby
with the extra work that he had to do each day to continue his
progress in school. Bill and Bobby worked together each day on
tutorial books that helped Bobby improve his reading and learning
skills. The extra time paid off, and Bobby began to do very well in
school. Bill and Bobby have a very strong bond and spent a lot of
time together. Bill has expressed that he has attempted to make up
for the problems that he had with his older children by being a
devoted father to Bobby.
In 1998, Bill received a notice that the public housing project in
which he was living was being renovated and that he would have to
vacate his apartment for the duration of the construction. He
attempted to locate alternate housing for himself and Bobby after
receiving the notice, but was unable to do so. He also could not find
a suitable homeless shelter for them, because most shelters serve
either women and children or adult men. Bill could not find space
for them in any shelters that allowed men and children to be housed
11. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 24 (West 1994) (authorizing DSS to
terminate parental rights).
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together. Not wanting his son to be homeless, he arranged for Bobby
to stay with one of his older daughters, Bobbys half sister, Belulah,
and her four children.
The anxiety of moving out of his home into a shelter, and not
having Bobby with him, caused Bill to experience a brief relapse in
his alcoholism. After Bobby was already living with Belulah and her
children, Bill drank beer with a neighbor several times during the two
weeks immediately preceding their move-out date. A DSS case
worker stopped by his apartment during one of these relapses,
claiming that she was conducting a  site visit even though, to Bills
knowledge, DSS had never been involved with Bobby or opened a file
on his family. Bobby was not even staying with him at the time. Bill
suspected that Belulah, having residual anger over the tragic events
of her childhood, may have called the Department and claimed that
he was neglecting Bobby. The DSS caseworker went to Belulahs
12
home and advised her to obtain a temporary guardianship of Bobby.
DSS also initiated a service plan for the family.
Shortly after the DSS caseworker visited his home, Bill entered into
an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. When Belulah
petitioned the court for a ninety day guardianship of Bobby, Bill
consented, since he was in the rehabilitation program and still did
not have permanent housing for himself and his son. He wanted
Belulah to have the legal authority to make important decisions for
Bobby, in such areas as his education or medical care, while he was
staying with her. Both DSS and Belulah represented to Bill that the
guardianship would only last ninety days. Once the guardianship was
in place, DSS withdrew its service plan and closed the case. Bill
continued with the service plan voluntarily even after the
Departments involvement ended.
During the ninety days that Belulah had legal custody of Bobby,
Bill completed his treatment program and found a new two-bedroom
apartment in a secured complex for himself and Bobby. He attends
Alcoholics Anonymous four times a week, therapy twice a week, and
he participates in mood management classes twice a week. In
addition, he voluntarily contracted with an alcohol screening service
to conduct random toxicological screens (blood alcohol tests) and
breathalyzers on him in order to ensure his accountability and to
document his continuing sobriety. All of the results of those tests
12. There are two main types of guardianships for minor children in
Massachusetts: temporary and permanent guardianships. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch.
201, § 14 (West 1994) (authorizing appointment of temporary guardians); MASS.
GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 201, § 2 (West 1994) (authorizing appointment of permanent
guardians).
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have been negative and there has been no doubt about his sobriety.
While Bobby was living with Belulah, Bill did everything that he
could to have contact with him. They spoke on the phone every day
and Bill visited Belulahs house frequently. During the temporary
guardianship, Belulah allowed Bobby to spend weekends at his
fathers apartment. Bill made arrangements with Bobbys school to
have special weekend homework packets put together for them, since
Bobbys schoolwork had been slipping while living with Belulah. Just
before the expiration of the ninety day guardianship, the entire
family spent Thanksgiving together. Apparently things did not go
well, and Belulah and Bill got into an argument over Belulahs
childhood.
Shortly after Thanksgiving, when the temporary guardianship
expired, Bill went to get Bobby from Belulah, but she refused to
relinquish custody of him. She forbade Bill from communicating or
visiting with Bobby, even changing her phone number so that he
could not call anymore. She accused her father of being a drunk and
filed a petition with the court to extend the guardianship for another
ninety days. DSS supported Belulahs attempt to keep custody of
Bobby, even though they had no official involvement in the matter
since the Department had closed its file on Bobby. While Bill could
13
have simply taken Bobby and left, he chose to wait for the courts
ruling in order to spare his son any trauma or instability. While
Belulahs petition to extend the temporary guardianship was
pending, the holidays came and went. The only contact that she
allowed was a phone call from Bobby to Bill telling him that he could
drop off Bobbys Christmas presents at Belulahs house. In addition,
Belulah also applied for Social Security disability benefits for Bobby
without Bills knowledge or consent. Bill strongly opposed receiving
the benefits because he was afraid that the benefits would stigmatize
Bobby or condition him not to be self-sufficient. During the limited
contact that Belulah allowed between them, Bobby has thrown
temper tantrums demanding to return home with his father. Since
the weekend visits were discontinued, Bobbys schoolwork
deteriorated and his behavioral problems returned. Bill attempted to
visit Bobby at school on several occasions, as a classroom volunteer
and to have lunch with him, but the visits proved too disruptive
because Bobby often threw temper tantrums when Bill left. Bill
arranged for Bobby to be treated by a psychiatrist, who determined
Bill to be a fit parent and recommended that Bobby be returned to
13. Because Belulahs temporary guardianship of Bobby had expired, his legal
custody had automatically reverted back to his father.
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his custody.
14
Ultimately, the court denied Belulahs petition, although DSSs
recommendation made the process far more difficult and time
consuming than necessary. By the time that he returned to his
fathers custody, Bobby had been living with Belulah for almost a
year. While living with Belulah, Bobby lost valuable progress with his
behavior and school work. In addition, during that time Bobby and
Bill were unable to spend Christmas or Bobbys birthday together.
C. Case #3: Carla C.s Foster Placement
Christine C. is the mother of three children, Carl, Carla and
Carolyn C., all of whom have different fathers. Carl lives with
Christines ex-husband, Christopher C.
Carla lives with her
guardians, David and Danielle D., who are Christophers sister and
brother-in-law. Carolyn is an infant and lives with Christine.
Christine suffers from a mental illness that can be fairly severe
when untreated. However, her illness is controllable and, when she
complies with the treatment recommended by her doctors, Christine
is symptom-free and stable. She was diagnosed with her illness shortly
after she and Christopher divorced, when Carla was an infant. At that
time, DSS became involved with Christine and Carla. The DSS case
worker who conducted the assessment found Christine to be
psychotic and mentally unstable. DSS sought legal custody of Carla,
which the court granted. DSS gave physical custody of Carla to David
and Danielle D. The court ordered DSS to establish a service plan
with the goal of reuniting Christine and Carla. An initial attempt at
reunification failed.
Christine sought treatment for her mental illness, and after
approximately two years her psychiatrist pronounced her: stable;
compliant with her treatment; no longer showing any symptoms of
psychosis or depression; and able to live on her own. At that time,
DSS returned Carla to Christines care, where she remained for
several months until Christine suffered a brief relapse in her mental
illness. During Christines hospitalization DSS again briefly placed
Carla with David and Danielle. Later that year, after Christines
condition stabilized, DSS again placed Carla with Christine, but the
14. The legal standard in Massachusetts for extending a temporary guardianship
of a minor child without the assent of the childs parent(s) is clear and convincing
evidence of current parental unfitness. See Freeman v. Chaplic, 446 N.E.2d 1369,
1373 (Mass. 1983); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1211, 1215 (Mass. 1980);
Petition of Kauch, 264 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Mass. 1970). In the instant case, the Probate
Court denied Belulahs petition for a second temporary guardianship of Bobby,
finding that she had not proven that Bill was an unfit parent.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2002

9

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 9
LEONETTI_FINAL

76

3/1/02 1:30 AM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 10:1

Department retained legal custody of Carla in order to monitor the
reunification. Christine successfully complied with the DSS service
plan for more than six months until she was hospitalized again.
When Christine arrived at the hospital by ambulance, a case
manager notified DSS by telephone. DSS contacted David and
Danielle D. to ask them if they would be willing to act as foster
parents again. At that time, DSS discovered that David had an open
Category I criminal charge from several years earlier. However, DSS
did not remove Carla from David and Danielles care, as the
regulations require. Instead, the Department closed its case file on
Carla and advised David and Danielle to seek guardianship. During
the proceeding on David and Danielles petition for temporary
guardianship of Carla, DSS updated the court on Carlas status and
recommended that the petition be granted. When Christine was
released from the hospital one month later, she sought visitation with
Carla, but David and Danielle refused to allow her to have even
minimal contact with her daughter. Christine petitioned the court
for visitation with Carla, but the court denied her motion.
The court appointed a GAL to conduct a sixty-day evaluation of
Carlas custody situation and extended David and Danielles
guardianship of Christine for another ninety days, pending the GALs
report. Despite the courts order that the GAL complete its report
within sixty days, a year-and-a-half passed before she submitted the
report. During that time, David and Danielle refused to allow
Christine any contact with Carla. The courts denied Christines
repeated attempts to seek visitation pending the outcome of the
much overdue GAL evaluation. Also during that time, David and
Danielles temporary guardianship of Carla lapsed for more than one
year, leaving Carla with no clear legal custodian since DSS had closed
15
her case and Christine had no contact with Carla. By the time the
GALs report was complete, Christine had been stable, compliant and
symptom-free for almost two years, and was residing in a structured,
residential facility where she underwent extensive therapy and job
training. Despite these facts, because Carla had been in David and
Danielles custody for so long, with no contact whatsoever with
16
Christine, a change of custody was no longer feasible.
At the
15. Because David and Danielles temporary guardianship of Carla had lapsed,
legal custody theoretically reverted back to her mother, Christine. During this time
period, Christine could have demanded that David and Danielle return Carla to her
and their refusal arguably could have constituted kidnapping. However, out of
concern for her daughters well-being and desire to reach a permanent judicial
determination, Christine chose to await a court order on the matter.
16. See Cennami v. Dept of Pub. Welfare, 363 N.E.2d 539, 546 (Mass. 1977)
(declaring that after a  sufficient duration . . . a substitute parental relationship is
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recommendation of the GAL, Christine ultimately consented to grant
David and Danielle a permanent guardianship of Carla in exchange
for modest daytime visitation rights. The GALs appointment was
extended for two years to allow her to monitor visitation between
Christine and Carla and to ensure that visitation continues in the
future.
III. A NALYSIS
The DSS circumvented at least one major substantive requirement
or procedural safeguard in each of the three cases presented in Part
II of this Article. That circumvention had tangible impacts, in each
case, on the custody of the children involved. Part III compares the
practices employed by DSS in these three cases to the procedural
system envisioned by the Massachusetts legislature and appellate
courts to demonstrate that the envisioned system is not being
realized.
A. Removal of a Child from a Parents Custody
Massachusetts law provides that  [a]ny child under eighteen years
who is left in any place and who is seemingly without a parent or legal
guardian available shall be immediately reported to the department
[of social services], which shall proceed to arrange care for such child
temporarily and that DSS shall  forthwith cause search to be made
for parent or guardian. 17 It further provides that  if [the] parent or
guardian cannot be found or is unable or refuses to make suitable
provisions for the child, the department [of social services] shall
make such lawful provision as seems for the best interest of such child
18
within the provisions of this chapter.
Courts have interpreted the Due Process Clause to require that a
parent be afforded a hearing to contest DSS caseworkers decisions
that a parent has not made suitable provisions for a child pursuant to
19
this subdivision. The hearing must be provided before a child is
removed from the custody of her natural parents. The removal of a
recognized by our law to be a legally protected right. ).
17. MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 23 (West 1993).
18. Id.
19. See White v. Minter, 330 F. Supp. 1194, 1197 (D. Mass. 1971) (holding that a
mothers constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment were violated because six months elapsed before she was provided  an
opportunity to appear before any tribunal, whether administrative or judicial, to
contest a case worker decision that the mother was unfit); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 ( Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . . ).
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child from nonconsenting parents must be based upon a judicial
determination that the parents are currently unfit to care for the
20
child.
In none of the three cases presented above were these procedures
followed. Clearly, both Amy and Bill made  suitable provisions for
their children by leaving them in the care of reasonable substitute
caregivers (grandparents in Amys case and an adult sister in Bills,
both of whom had extensive caregiving experience). In both cases,
the caretaking arrangements were temporary and were implemented
because the parents were undergoing inpatient treatment programs
where their children could not be present. In none of the three
cases, prior to the removal of their children from their custody, was a
hearing provided for the parents to contest that the provisions made
for their children by DSS were unsuitable.
In none of the three cases presented above was there, or has there
ever been, a judicial determination of parental unfitness. In Amys
case, the court granted Andrew temporary custody under the divorce
statute without ever making a determination of Amys fitness. In
Bills case, the first temporary guardianship was granted to Belulah
with his consent and the second was ultimately denied by the court
precisely because there was no evidence that he was an unfit parent.
In Christines case, she was not present when David and Danielle
obtained the first temporary guardianship of Carla because she was
hospitalized and so, since the petition was without objection, no
determination of unfitness was required. When the temporary
guardianship was extended, it was without a determination of
21
The
unfitness pending the outcome of the GAL evaluation.
20. See Adoption of a Minor, 438 N.E.2d 38, 43 (Mass. 1982). Current parental
unfitness must be established by clear and convincing evidence, whether determined
under the care and custody statute, MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, §§ 21-39 (West
1993), or under the adoption statute, MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 210, § 3 (West 1998).
See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 29B (requiring a determination of the  childs
best interests and that  reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families be made
when considering the future status of a child that has previously been removed from
nonconsenting parents); In re Care and Protection of Laura, 610 N.E.2d 934, 938
(Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of Carlos, 596 N.E.2d 1383, 1389 (Mass. 1992); In re
Care and Protection of Martha, 553 N.E.2d 902, 907 (Mass. 1990); In re Care and
Protection of Stephen, 514 N.E.2d 1087, 1092 (Mass. 1987) Care and Protection of
Three Minors, 467 N.E.2d 851, 857 (Mass. 1984) (holding that proof of unfitness by
clear and convincing evidence is constitutionally required); see generally Santovsky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that, before a state may remove a child
completely from the care and custody of natural parent(s), due process requires that
the state support its allegation of unfitness by at least clear and convincing evidence).
21. Christines attorneys at the time argued that, given the legal presumption
against a guardianship over the opposition of the parent, absent clear and
convincing evidence of parental unfitness, custody should revert back to Christine
pending the GALs evaluation.
Their opposition was dismissed.  Christine
subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal to a single justice of the Court of Appeals,
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permanent guardianship was granted with Christines consent, which
she gave in exchange for visitation rights with Carla and in
recognition of the fact that the passage of so much time had made a
finding of unfitness likely.
1.

Neglect

Generally, DSS involvement with a family is initiated when the
22
Department receives a report of suspected child abuse or neglect.
DSS regulations define neglect as the  failure by a caretaker . . . to take
those actions necessary to provide a child with minimally adequate
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, supervision, emotional stability
23
and growth, or other essential care . . . . The definition of caretaker
includes a guardian or  any other person entrusted with the
responsibility for a childs health or welfare in the childs home, [or]
24
a relatives home . . . .
It is hard to imagine how the custodial arrangements made by Amy
and Bill for their children could constitute neglect under this
standard. In fact, the definition of caretaker specifically entails
substitute caregiving arrangements. Furthermore, in Bills case, in
order for his actions to constitute neglect, it would have to be
because the caregiver with whom he left Bobby was inadequate. This
hardly makes sense given that the caregiver was Belulah, the person
with whom DSS sided in the guardianship proceedings.
DSS conducts an initial screening of all reports of alleged abuse or
25
neglect that it receives. If DSS receives a report of subject matter or
events that do not constitute child abuse or neglect, it is  screened
26
out. The reporter is advised that the report is not appropriate and
DSS must treat the report as a request for information rather than a
27
report of abuse or neglect. If DSS receives a report of suspected
child abuse or neglect that it finds reliable, it is  screened in and the
Department must investigate and evaluate the reported information

which was denied without hearing.
22. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 51A (West 1993) (providing for
mandatory reporting for certain professionals as well as voluntary reporting by
anyone else who has reasonable cause to believe that child abuse or neglect is
occurring).
23. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 2.00 (1993) (italics in original).
24. Id.
25. See tit. 110, § 4.21.
26. See id.
27. See tit. 110, § 4.20(3); see generally tit. 110, § 3.01 (providing information and
referral services).
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within ten days. After the completion of its investigation, DSS must
make a determination of whether the allegations of child abuse or
neglect are supported or unsupported. A finding of supported means that
DSS  has reasonable cause to believe that an incident . . . of abuse or
29
neglect by a caretaker did occur.
In Amys case, it seems that the DSS employee who received the
report of neglect that was filed by the hospital counselor could have
screened it out because it did not constitute neglect or abuse. At a
minimum, the report should have been found to be unsupported
once the caseworker visited Abby in the loving home of her
grandparents.
In both Bill and Christines cases, DSS never
conducted an investigation of the alleged abuse and neglect. Instead,
they closed their files on Bobby and Carla and instructed their
caregivers to seek custody through private proceedings. In Amys
case, once DSS found that the allegations of neglect were supported,
it closed the case file without taking any further action in the matter
and counseled Andrew on how to obtain custody of Abby through the
probate and family court.
Even if one or all of the children involved in these three cases were
abused or neglected, it seems illogical at best for DSS to proceed in
this manner. In the cases of Amy and Bill, they had both been their
childs primary, if not sole, caretakers for Abby and Bobbys entire
lives. Even if the allegations in these cases were supported, DSS
involvement, coupled with a service plan for providing and
monitoring services while leaving Abby and Bobby with their primary
caretakers, certainly would have been preferable to an unmonitored
transfer of custody to a  deadbeat dad in one case and a nonparent
in the other. Furthermore, if DSS had genuine concerns for Abby
and Bobbys safety, it should have retained ongoing supervision of
their custody by keeping their cases open, which is, after all, the
underlying purpose of the Department and of its care and protection
authority.
2.

Care and Protection Proceedings

The standard procedure for committing a child to the care and
protection of DSS is governed by Massachusetts General Laws chapter
28. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 51B (West 1993); MASS. REGS. CODE tit.
110, § 4.31 (1993). There is a shorter time frame if the report is designated an
emergency report by the DSS screener because  the reported condition poses a threat of
immediate danger to the life, health or physical safety of the child. Tit. 110, § 4.25.
Emergency reports must be completed within twenty-four hours after receipt of the
report of abuse or neglect. See tit. 110, § 4.26, 4.31.
29. Tit. 110, § 4.32 (italics in original).
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119, section 24. A petition for care and custody must be brought in
the juvenile court department and must allege that a minor child is
without necessary and proper physical or educational care and
discipline; is growing up under conditions damaging to her sound
character development; or is lacking proper attention of a parent or
guardian; or whose parents, guardian or custodian are unwilling,
incompetent or unavailable to provide any such care, discipline or
30
attention. In such a case, the child should be brought before the
court, notice should be issued to DSS and summonses should be
served upon both parents to show cause why the child should not be
31
committed to DSS custody. Custody of the child is to be transferred
to DSS or a foster home only if the juvenile court finds  reasonable
cause to believe that the child is suffering from serious abuse or
neglect, or is in immediate danger of serious abuse or neglect, and
that immediate removal of the child is necessary to protect the child
from serious abuse or neglect, unless the parents consent to the
32
transfer.
Care and protection proceedings, pursuant to Massachusetts
33
General Laws chapter 119, were not initiated in either Amy or Bills
cases above. Instead, DSS abdicated its responsibility in all three
cases and closed them by ushering the substitute caretakers into
private custody proceedings. In the cases of Amy and Bill, it seems
unlikely that DSS could have succeeded in obtaining court-ordered
custody of Abby or Bobby. By ushering them into a temporary
custody arrangement and temporary guardianship, respectively, DSS
deprived them of custodial relationships with their primary
caretakers, both of whom had strong parental bonds with their
children. Furthermore, the legal standard for transferring custody in
Amys divorce case is far less strict than the standard for terminating
parental rights, even temporarily, through a care and protection
proceeding.34 This less stringent standard helps to explain how Abby
30. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 24 (West 1994).
31. See id.
32. Id. As a condition of receiving federal foster care funds, states are required
to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families prior to the placement of
the child in foster care in order to eliminate the need to remove the child from her
home and/or to enable the child to return home safely. This requirement does not
apply if the parent has subjected the child to  aggravated circumstances (e.g.
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse or sexual abuse). See Adoption and Safe
Families Act ( ASFA ), 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (Supp.
V 1999). In response to ASFA, Massachusetts now makes the safety of the child the
paramount factor in the decision whether or not to remove her from her home. See
1999 Mass. Acts ch. 3.
33. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 51A (West 1993).
34. Probate and family courts use the more nebulous  best interests of the child
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could have spent a year in the custody of a person who never even
had regular visitation with her, much less contributed to her material
needs. Furthermore, in practice, the old adage of  possession is
nine-tenths of the law seems to govern many child custody
proceedings between private parties in Massachusetts in a way that it
35
does not in DSS cases. Judges frequently look to the person with
whom the child is currently residing for an indication of which
36
parent has the stronger bond and is the childs primary caregiver.
In Carlas case, it might have been reasonable for DSS to conclude
that Christine was not able to provide for her childs best interests, at
least temporarily during her hospitalization. However, there is no
way to know that now, given that there was no opportunity for a court
to look at evidence of Christines alleged unfitness or to examine the
appropriateness of David and Danielles home.
In addition to the different substantive legal standards used to
award custody in care and protection proceedings as opposed to
custody proceedings between private parties, there is also a
fundamental procedural difference. In Massachusetts, parents have
the right to the assistance of counsel at all hearings relating to care
37
and protection proceedings. This entitlement does not extend to
private custody proceedings such as Amy and Andrews divorce or the
38
guardianship proceedings in Bill and Christines cases.
3.

Emergency Removal

Massachusetts law has a provision for the emergency removal of a
child that permits a child to be taken into DSS custody without a
39
court proceeding. However, according to DSS regulations, these
standard, which is measured by a preponderance of the evidence, in apportioning
custody among divorced parents, rather than the current parental unfitness by clear
and convincing evidence that is required when the state is a party to a custodial
proceeding. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
35. See generally In re Adoption of Carlos, 596 N.E.2d 1383, 1388 (Mass. 1992)
(noting that the passage of time can create a recognized right to custody).
36. See id. (noting that the childs regular visitation with, and attachment to, his
mother weighed heavily in the courts denial of adoption without parental consent).
37. See MASS. GEN . LAWS ch. 119, § 29 (1993); In re Care and Protection of
Stephen, 514 N.E.2d 1087, 1090 (Mass. 1987).
38. The theory behind providing assistance of counsel in all proceedings relating
to the custody of children to which DSS is a party is that these proceedings involve
the coercive intervention of the state into the private sphere of family, which is not
true in custody disputes between two private parties who, at least theoretically,
already have a familial interest in the child whose custody is at stake. See In re
Stephen, 514 N.E.2d at 1090. However, this distinction seems to break down in cases
like the three presented here, where state intervention initiates and supports the
private petitions for custody, although DSS is not officially a party to the proceedings.
39. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 51B (West 1993) (authorizing emergency
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emergency removals are  extreme measure[s] requiring dire
40
circumstances. A child may be immediately taken into DSS custody
if the social worker finds reasonable cause to believe:
(a) that a condition of serious abuse or neglect (including
abandonment) exists, and
(b) that, as a result of that condition, removal of the child is
necessary in order to avoid the risk of death or serious physical
injury of the child, and
(c) that the nature of the emergency is such that there is
41
inadequate time to seek a court order for removal.

If an emergency removal has occurred, DSS must file a written
report stating the reasons for such removal and must file a petition
for care and custody of the child, pursuant to Section 24 of Chapter
42
119.
It appears that this emergency removal procedure is what DSS
invoked in Amys case, since the DSS case worker appeared at Amys
parents house without warning and immediately took Abby into
custody, delivering her to a foster home. However, the Departments
seizure of Abby from her grandparents was inappropriate for at least
two reasons, one substantive and one procedural. First, it seems
highly unlikely that Abbys custodial arrangement with her
grandparents while Amy was in the hospital meets the three criteria
listed above. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Abbys
grandparents were anything other than loving caregivers with a great
deal of experience in providing for Abbys needs. Second, DSS never
filed a petition for care and custody of Abby in the court. Instead,
the Department simply allowed Andrew to remove Abby from foster
care for  visitation and never return her. It is hard to imagine how
that procedure could ever be the best way of promoting a childs
welfare, whether the allegations of abuse or neglect are substantiated
or not.
B. Ongoing DSS Involvement and Services
If an abused or neglected child has been committed to the custody
of DSS pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 119, DSS has
the responsibility to care for her until her permanent custody is
determined.43 On the other hand, DSS must close a case when the
removal if there is reasonable cause to believe it is necessary to protect the child from
further abuse or neglect).
40. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 4.29(1) (1993).
41. Id. § 4.29(2) (emphasis in original).
42. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 51B; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 4.29(3).
43. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 51B (West 1993).
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child is adopted or placed with a permanent legal guardian. DSS
failed to fulfill this responsibility in all three cases presented here.
In Abbys case, DSS closed the file based upon a temporary order
of custody to Andrew. In Bobbys case, DSS closed the case after
Belulah had obtained a temporary, ninety day guardianship of Bobby.
In Carlas case, DSS dropped her off at David and Danielles home
and closed her case without any official determination of her custody,
even a temporary one. This created a situation in which Carla was
living with David and Danielle per DSS instructions. However, Carla
was still presumed to be in the legal custody of Christine, because no
one else had legal custody of her, until David and Danielle obtained a
temporary guardianship. This was true again for the more than one
year period when that temporary guardianship expired but Carla
continued to live with David and Danielle. Moreover, David and
Danielle did not even possess the legal authority to make educational
decisions or to authorize medical treatment for Carla without a valid
guardianship. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that DSS
closed Carlas case rather than appointing David and Danielle as
foster parents because David was ineligible to be a foster parent
45
because of his record of violent criminal activity.
DSS is required to establish and monitor service plans for children
in its custody, which it must evaluate in regard to its effectiveness in
46
protecting the child from further abuse or neglect. This is another
disadvantage of DSS dropping children in private custody
arrangements and closing their cases. If the suspicions of abuse or
neglect in any of these cases were meritorious, then the families, and
44. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 9.02(2) (1993).
45. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 28A, § 10A (West 1994) (prohibiting the
placement of children in foster homes where an occupant of the home has a
criminal record involving violence).
46. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 9.02(2); MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 51D
(West 1994 & Supp. 2001); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 6.02 (1993). A service plan is:
a written document which describes in detail the tasks to be undertaken and
the services to be provided to either: (1) strengthen a family unit; or (2)
provide an alternative permanent home for a child who has been removed
from his or her home; or (3) enable a mature minor to live independently.
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 6.01 (1993). The service plan also provides  a basis for
assessing the progress of family members in meeting the goal of the service plan.
Id. The service plan must be completed within ten days after the case assessment is
completed, but in no event later than fifty-five working days after the opening of a
case. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 5.02; see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, §
6.06(1). For the purposes of developing a service plan, the opening of a case occurs
at the time of the decision that a report of suspected abuse is supported or a court
order giving custody to DSS. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 6.06(3). Except in an
emergency, every family must have a service plan prior to placing a child in substitute
care. Id. § 6.06(2). The service plan must, as much as possible, be jointly developed
by DSS and the clients receiving the services. Id. § 6.07(1).
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particularly the best interests of the children, would have been best
47
served by ongoing DSS involvement and support. If the allegations
of abuse or neglect were without foundation, then the children would
have been better off had they not been removed from their primary
caretakers, particularly in Amy and Bills cases where Abby and Bobby
were both returned home eventually. Forcing families to undergo
multiple court proceedings relating to the temporary custody of
children is far less conducive to the goal of providing children with
stable and permanent custodial environments than a commitment to
removing children only when that removal is necessary for their
welfare and supporting the existing family structures when it is not.
C. Foster Care
DSS is required to conduct an initial screening process for any
prospective foster parent to determine if the individual and all
household members meet the Departments initial eligibility
criteria.48 This initial screening includes a criminal offender records
49
information ( CORI ) check for all adult household members.
Among other things, the eligibility criteria mandate that a
prospective foster parent is ineligible if he/she, or a member of her
household, has a criminal record that, in the judgment of the
Department, bears adversely upon the individuals ability to assume
50
and carry out the responsibilities of being a foster parent.
According to the DSS screening policy, an individual will also be
ineligible if he/she has been convicted of a Category I criminal
charge, or any other violent crime, whether or not that charge
51
remains open.
In order to be licensed as a foster parent, an
individual  must be willing to accept and support the childs
52
relationship with his/her parents and siblings. Foster placements
are supposed to be made in the best interests of the child and in a
manner conducive to the safe and timely return of the child to her
47. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.128 (1993).
48. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.100(2) (1993).
49. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 28A, § 10A (West 1994).
50. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.100(3)(a). Pursuant to the Social Security
Act, as amended by ASFA, federal law also requires states to perform criminal record
checks on all prospective foster parents before the childs foster placement is
approved and forbids placement with a foster parent who was convicted of a felony
involving violence. See 42 U.S.C. § 471(a) (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 671 (Supp.
V 1999).
51. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 28A, § 10A (West 1994); DSS Policy #86-014
(stating that if the result of the screening process indicates any Category I criminal
charge, the result will be that  no child shall be placed in said home ).
52. See MASS. REGS CODE tit. 110, § 7.104(1)(h) (1993).
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original home. In assessing what is in a childs best interest, DSS is
required to consider, among other things, the close proximity to the
childs parent(s) and the ability for frequent visits between the child
54
and her parent(s). If DSS obtains information after the time of the
initial foster care eligibility screening process that would have
excluded the individual from being a foster parent, DSS must
discontinue the foster care assessment and notify the individual that
55
she is ineligible. If the child was already placed with the ineligible
56
foster parent, she must be removed from the home immediately.
DSS is also required to conduct foster care reviews ( FCRs ) within
57
six months after a case is opened and every six months thereafter.
This is the phase in Carlas case where DSS most flagrantly violated its
own regulations. David and Danielle were clearly not eligible to be
Carlas foster parents. Not only did Davids criminal record make the
58
family ineligible, but their repeated expressed desire for Carla to
terminate all contact with Christine independently prevented their
59
In addition, they were not  willing to accept and
eligibility.
support Carlas relationship with Christine, and David and Danielle
repeatedly badmouthed Christine to Carla and insisted that Carla
refer to them as  mommy and  daddy. They also repeatedly told
Carla that they wished to adopt her permanently. Furthermore,
Davids criminal conviction was more than ten years old, resulting in
David and Danielle being ineligible to be foster parents for Carla the
first two times that she was placed with them.60 Presumably, DSS must
not have conducted the required CORI search of the household
residents at all during the first two placements.
Once the caseworker assigned to Carlas case discovered that David
and Danielle were ineligible to be foster parents, she should have
53. See id. § 7.101.
54. See id. § 7.101(1).
55. See id. § 7.106(4).
56. See id. § 7.108. While DSS is generally forbidden from placing a child in any
foster home prior to the placement being approved, there is an exception for the
emergency placement of children with relatives or close family friends. See MASS.
GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 28A, § 10A (West 1994); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 1.10, § 7.108
(1993). However, because DSS is prohibited by law from placing children in
unapproved settings, if the Department later discovers that the foster home is
ineligible, the child must be removed immediately. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch.
28A, § 10A; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.108 (comment).
57. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, §§ 6.10, 6.12 (1993).
58. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
59. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.104(1)(h) (1993) (requiring that foster
parents support a childs relationship with the childs natural parents).
60. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (detailing criminal background
check requirements).
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placed Carla in an eligible foster home. Simply closing the case while
leaving Carla in the physical care of David and Danielle and
encouraging them to seek guardianship on their own was entirely
inappropriate, and in direct violation of the Massachusetts Code of
61
If DSS thinks that its regulations for foster home
Regulations.
eligibility are too strict or rigid or otherwise not in the best interests
of the children it is seeking to place, DSS should change the
regulations, not circumvent them in the case of individual
placements like Carlas.
D. Final Disposition
Absent written findings of extraordinary circumstances requiring
continued judicial intervention, the court must enter a final order of
adjudication and permanent disposition no later than fifteen months
after the date that the case was first filed.62 That deadline may be
extended once for a period of not more that three months if the
court makes a written finding that the parent has made consistent
and goal-oriented progress likely to lead to the childs return to the
63
parents care and custody. The court must make written findings in
support of its final order of adjudication and permanent disposition
within a reasonable time of the order, including written findings of
64
fact and conclusions of law. The committing court must reconvene
within twelve months of its original grant of custody, commitment, or
transfer of responsibility of a child to DSS, as well as periodically
thereafter, while the child remains in the care of the DSS, to
65
This determination
determine the future status of the child.
includes whether or not it is in the childs best interests to be
returned to the parents; to be placed in another substitute
placement; to be placed for adoption; to have a guardian other than
DSS appointed; or to continue in substitute care on a permanent or

61. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 1.02 (1993) (stating that  [a]s soon as it is
determined that reunification is not feasible, the Department shall take swift action
to implement another permanent plan, such as adoption or guardianship. ).
62. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 26 (West 1994). In response to ASFA,
Massachusetts recently enacted a new requirement that a permanency hearing be
conducted within twelve months of a childs commitment to the states custody. See
1999 MASS. A CTS ch. 3. At the hearing, the child either must be returned to the
custody of her parents or placed in an adoption, guardianship or another permanent
custodial arrangement. See id.
63. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 26 (West 1994).
64. See id. § 27.
65. See id. § 29B; 1999 MASS. A CTS ch. 3, § 12 (amending ch. 119, § 29B to its
present form).
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long term basis in a specific placement.
Because DSS evaded the ordinary care and protection process and
closed its case files on these three children, the timetable
requirements for a final disposition of child custody matters was
circumvented. The time requirements of Chapter 119 exist to
promote stability in childrens custodial arrangements. They also
exist because dragging families into multiple court proceedings is
time consuming, expensive and emotionally disruptive (i.e., not in
the best interests of families and children, which DSS is supposed to
ensure). In Abbys case, it took approximately one year for her
physical custody to transfer back to Amy and, to this day, that custody
remains temporary. Although Amy has appeared before several
different judges, the court still has not entered a final order
returning Abbys permanent custody to her. In Carlas case, the
parties spent years waiting for an overdue GAL evaluation, during
which time Christine had no contact with Carla, even after the birth
of Carlas sister, Carolyn. Carla met her baby sister for the first time
when she was six months old. The only reason that visitation began
at all was because the case was transferred to a new judge, who
expressed disbelief that such a long series of temporary guardianships
had been extended without a final resolution, due to a scheduling
anomaly. The lost years of contact between Christine and Carla have
devastated their relationship. Carla now calls Danielle her mother
and is afraid to spend time with Christine. The best that either
Christine or Carla can hope for at this point is that they can visit one
another regularly. Even if it is appropriate that Carla reside with
David and Danielle, the GAL made clear in her final report that the
lack of visitation with Christine in the intervening years has been
traumatic for Carla. If Christine were to experience a relapse of her
mental illness, visitation should only be suspended as long as it is
required for her to regain stability. Unfortunately, the GALs report
will probably not even be given to DSS and her suggestions certainly
are not binding on the Department with respect to its future
behavior. In fact, the GAL report is impounded with the probate
court and can only be accessed by court order.
The court may make any appropriate order to further the childs
best interests, provided that the court has determined that, as
appropriate, DSS has made reasonable efforts prior to the placement
of the child in foster care to prevent or eliminate the removal of the
66. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 29B (West 1994); see also 1999 MASS. A CTS
ch. 3 (noting that effective March 31, 1999, a written determination is required if
DSS decides not to attempt reunification).
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67

child from her home. DSS must also have made, as appropriate,
reasonable efforts after the placement of the child in foster care to
68
make it possible for the child to return to her home. Whenever a
court grants custody of a child to DSS, it must certify that the
continuation of the child in her home is contrary to her best interests
and must determine whether DSS, as appropriate, has made
reasonable efforts  to prevent or eliminate the need for removal
69
from the home before the child is placed with DSS.
In none of these three cases was there any demonstration that
foster care was necessary, much less was there any effort on the part
of DSS prior to placement to keep these children in their homes. By
closing the case files as soon as temporary custody had transferred to
substitute custodians, DSS relinquished any obligation to attempt to
reunify these three families that it had split apart.
1.

Guardianships

The Departments policy with respect to sponsoring guardianships
for children in their custody is that they will sponsor them only for
children who are not likely to return to their parents and who, for
whatever reason, are not candidates for adoption.70 Clearly, DSS
failed to consider, much less establish, the presence of its criteria for
sponsoring a private guardianship in the cases of Bobby and Carla.
First, Bobby quite clearly was able to return to Bills custody and Carla
might have been able to be reunited with Christine if DSS had not
67. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 29C (West 1994).
68. See id.
69. Id. § 29C.
70. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.300 (1993); see also id. § 7.301 (stating that
the specific criteria for DSS sponsorship of a guardianship are that: (1) the child is
unable to return to her biological parents; (2) there is no reasonable likelihood that
the child will be adopted; (3) the child has resided with the potential guardians for
at least one year; and (4) the child is at least twelve years old). However, the third
and forth criteria are waivable if DSS determines that it is in the childs best interest
to do so. See id. § 7.302. Once DSS has determined that a child meets the criteria for
sponsorship, several additional implementation steps must be completed. First, the
DSS social worker must meet with the child and the potential guardian to present the
guardianship plan for their consideration and approval. See id. § 7.302(2). Second,
the social worker must make reasonable and diligent efforts to contact the childs
parents and inform them of the proposed guardianship proceeding, their right to
contest the proceeding and their right, if indigent, of court-appointed counsel. See
id. § 7.302(3). Third, a member of the DSS legal staff must prepare the appropriate
court papers. If the parents of the child have not consented to the guardianship in
writing, they will be given notice as required by law. See id. § 7.302(4). Fourth, a
member of the DSS legal staff must initiate and prosecute all court proceedings
necessary to finalize the guardianship. The guardianship plan must be presented to
the court for review as part of the proceeding, and the plan must address the
appropriateness of the proposed placement and suitability of the proposed
guardians. See id. § 7.302(5).
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closed her case at the very beginning. In the several years since David
and Danielle were awarded the first temporary guardianship,
Christine had been compliant with her treatment program, stable
and living on her own. Second, there is no evidence that DSS
conducted any assessment of whether it was likely that Bobby or Carla
would be adopted, or whether that would even be desirable. Third,
neither Bobby nor Carla had resided with Belulah or David and
Danielle, respectively, at the time they sought and DSS supported
their guardianships. Fourth, both Bobby and Carla were substantially
younger than twelve years old at the time that DSS supported the
petition for their guardianships. Fifth, none of the procedural
requirements of the DSS regulations regarding DSS participation in
the planning and filing of guardianship paperwork was met.
2.

Visitation

A parent whose child has been placed in foster care by DSS has the
right to petition the probate court for information regarding the
childs placement and for the right to visitation with the child if it is
71
consistent with the welfare of the child. DSS is required to plan and
to promote regular and frequent visitation between children in foster
care and their parents and/or siblings to the extent that such
72
visitation is consistent with the familys service plan. In order to
terminate or deny visitation rights to a parent whose child is in the
court-ordered custody of DSS, a court must make specific findings
73
that such visits would harm the child or the public welfare.
Because DSS closed the case files on Abby, Bobby and Carla, their
parents had none of the procedural safeguards to ensure the
continued contact that would have benefited for the well-being of
these children. Andrew refused to allow Amy anything but minimal
visitation for the year that Abby lived with him. Amys initial attempts
to seek court-ordered visitation were denied. After the expiration of
her initial ninety day guardianship of Bobby, until the court finally
denied her petition to extend guardianship, Belulah allowed Bill no
contact with Bobby, even during the Christmas holiday. David and
71. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 35 (West 1994).
72. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.128 (1993).
73. See In re Custody of a Minor(No. 2), 491 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Mass. 1986); In re
Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 467 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (Mass. 1984) (finding that the
mothers visitation rights were wrongfully terminated because  [t]he judge failed,
however, to make specific and detailed findings regarding the psychological effect of
returning the child to the custody of her parents. ); see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit.
110, § 7.128 (1993) (explaining that DSS will not terminate visitation unless the
matter is brought before a judge or unless a parents right to notice and consent of
adoption has been dispensed).
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Danielle prevented Christine from having any contact with Carla for
several years while she was in their physical custody, even though they
did not even have legal custody of her at that time. The lack of
contact between Christine and Carla during that time period was a
primary factor in Christines inability to regain custody of Carla once
her mental illness had stabilized. The burden of seeking visitation
with a child who is in the custody of a private party is on the movant,
rather than on the state as it is when DSS seeks to deny visitation to a
74
parent whose child is in the Departments custody. Consequently,
the fact that DSS never formally sought court-ordered custody of
Abby, Bobby or Carla was a crucial factor in their lack of contact
while not in their custody.
E. Childrens Privacy
All care and custody proceedings instituted by DSS pursuant to
Chapter 119 of the Massachusetts General Laws are conducted in
designated juvenile sessions of the court, which are closed to the
general public, and the names of the persons before the court in any
such hearing are impounded.75
This is not true of custody
proceedings between private parties, such as guardianships and
custody hearings incident to a divorce, which are conducted in the
76
regular session of the probate court and are open to the public.
The parties names are used on the docket, the files are a matter of
public record and anyone with a drivers license can access all of the
77
filings and obtain a tape recording of any hearing. This is true even
though the subject matter of a child custody proceeding is likely to be
78
the same whether DSS is a party or not. Even GAL evaluations,
which are supposed to be available only to the parties and their
attorneys, are frequently misfiled in the public portions of the
79
record. By ushering Abby, Bobby and Carla into private custody
proceedings with public records, DSS completely abrogated its
responsibility to protect the privacy of these children in sensitive
family law proceedings.
74. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, § 35 (West 1994).
75. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 119, §§ 38, 65 (West 1994).
76. See MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 209B, § 13 (West1994) (stating that the court
shall preserve pleadings, orders, and judgments, and all pertinent documents until
the child reaches age 18); see also MASS. GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 215, § 3 (West 1994)
(noting that probate courts have jurisdiction in divorce actions and petitions for
adoption of children).
77. See MASS GEN . LAWS A NN . ch. 209B, § 13 (West 1994).
78. See id.
79. See discussion, supra note 10 (outlining the role of GALs).
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IV. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Article is not to suggest that the legal standards
for the removal and substitute care of children who have suffered
from alleged abuse or neglect should be lessened, nor is it to suggest
that the  rights of parents are more important than the best
interests of children. Rather, the purpose of this Article is to suggest
that there is a wide gap in Massachusetts between the legal standards
for the care and protection of children and the actual practices of the
Department of Social Services. These standards exist because they
reflect the judgment of the Massachusetts legislature regarding the
best way to protect the welfare of minor children in the
Commonwealth. If that policy judgment is incorrect, the appropriate
forum for reform is political.
However, circumvention and
subversion of those standards, and their accompanying procedural
protections, is not an appropriate way to safeguard children. There is
no meaningful opportunity for reform or judicial oversight if DSS
caseworkers continue to act outside the scope of their legal authority,
particularly given the extensive impounding of juvenile records in the
Department to protect the privacy of minor children in its care and
custody. Instituting formal procedures for the care and protection of
children, whether they result in family reunification or termination of
the biological parents rights, is the best way to further DSSs dual
goal of protecting children and respecting families rights to  be free
from unwarranted state intervention. 80 It is also the best way to
ensure that children who have been neglected or abused obtain
access to the resources that DSS can provide and achieve the
custodial stability necessary for their mental and physical
development.
This Article is not an exhaustive study of the practices of the
Massachusetts Department of Social Services. It arose out of the
authors experience in working with a few individual legal services
clients in Suffolk and Middlesex Counties. It does, however, suggest
avenues for further inquiry. First, how widespread are the DSS
practices documented here?
Second, what can explain the occurrence of those practices? It is
possible that the gap between law and practice is simply the result of
DSS incompetence, perhaps because of scarce departmental
81
It is also possible that these practices represent a
resources.
80. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 1.01 (1993).
81. In a 1982 opinion granting a preliminary injunction to a class of plaintiffs
seeking to bring DSS into compliance with federal law, including the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (Supp. V 1999), by
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deliberate strategy on the part of DSS, or its caseworkers, to facilitate
a particular custodial outcome by closing cases and urging private
action in situations where the Department has identified a substitute
caretaker for the child that it deems fit. This strategy could be
employed by a savvy caseworker in order to take advantage of the less
stringent standards employed in private custody proceedings (i.e.,
proving in a probate court hearing that a transfer is in the best
interests of the child by a mere preponderance of the evidence)
rather than meeting the stricter requirement for DSS termination of
parental rights (i.e., proving, in a forum where parents are entitled to
the assistance of counsel, that removal of the child is necessary to
protect her from serious abuse or neglect, and that the parents are
82
currently unfit by clear and convincing evidence). This explanation
seems particularly plausible in light of Carlas case, in which the
probate court repeatedly granted temporary guardianships to David
and Danielle without any meaningful hearing or findings relating to
83
Christines parental fitness, a practice that was upheld on appeal.
This, in turn, begs an additional question: was the courts extension
of Carlas guardianships without applying the appropriate legal
standard, the result of sloppy jurisprudence or is it possible that
probate court judges are actively participating with DSS in
transferring the custody of minor children without findings of
unfitness? Or is there a third possibility namely, that probate
courts have begun to utilize the question of who has current physical
custody of a child as a de facto test of fitness based upon the
conventional psychological wisdom regarding the importance of
continuity of care for children?
Third, whether the practices documented in this case study are the
result of incompetence or deliberate circumvention? What do these
practices reveal about the institutional biases of the Department? Is it
significant that the three parents presented in this case study were
requiring the agency to provide each foster child in its custody with a case plan and a
periodic case review, Judge Keeton lamented that DSSs limited resources were
undoubtedly  a primary factor in the failure of protection of victimized children.
Lynch v. King, 550 F. Supp. 325, 327 (D. Mass. 1982).
82. See Petition of the Dept of Soc. Serv. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption,
444 N.E.2d 399, 400-01 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (noting that after the Supreme Courts
decision in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), Massachusetts state courts
changed the burden of proof in cases determining parental unfitness in DSS
proceedings); In re Care and Protection of Stephen, 514 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Mass.
1987) ( In determining whether custody may be removed from a biological parent
and awarded to the department the judge must find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the natural parent currently is unfit to further the welfare and the best
interests of the child. ).
83. See supra Part II.B, Case #2: Bill B.s  Unfitness.
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poor, mentally ill, or recovering from alcohol or drug dependency?
Fourth, what role does the passage of time play in these cases? Are
the lengthy delays in these three cases, particularly in Carlas case
where the sixty-day GAL report took more than a year to complete,
the result of bureaucratic overload or is this also a feature of a system
that is being manipulated by savvy caseworkers and psychologists to
stack the decks in favor of certain custodial resolutions?
Fifth, if Massachusetts DSS caseworkers are manipulating different
aspects of the custody system to achieve certain results that they feel
could not be achieved by strictly adhering to their regulations, where
does the Commonwealth go from here? It seems that there are two
possibilities. First, the existing legal standards governing substitute
care for minor children must reflect the reasoned and rational
judgment of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that those standards should be
enforced strictly. Alternatively, it is possible that these standards are
too strict and prevent DSS from adequately protecting children in
Commonwealth, forcing caseworkers to employ creative means of
working the system in order to rescue children from abusive
environments. If this is the case, perhaps the laws and regulations
need to change in order to enable transparency in the removal of
these children and their placement in suitable substitute care
environments.84

84. The desire to expedite the termination of parental rights was one of the
motivating factors behind the amendments to the Social Security Act enacted by
ASFA. See Pub. L. No. 108-59, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
According to Madelyn Freundlich, ASFA  brought
termination of parental rights to the forefront as a core strategy in permanency
planning for children in care. Madelyn Freundlich, Expediting Termination of
Parental Rights: Solving the Problem or Sowing the Seeds of a New Predicament?, 28 CAP. U.
L. REV. 97, 99 (1999). Proponents of expediting the process have argued that the
system focuses too much on the rights of parents and the preservation of biological
families at the expense of the safety and welfare of children. See, e.g., Richard J.
Gelles, Family Preservation and Child Maltreatment, in RETHINKING O RPHANAGES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 47 (Richard B. McKenzie ed., 1999). Opponents have pointed out
that, given the current overload of foster care and adoption services, using increased
resources to remove children from their homes rather than helping them to thrive in
their families is not the best way to promote the welfare of the children whose
interests are being protected. See id.
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